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Unconditionally secure social secret sharing scheme

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3 Author(s)
M. Nojoumian ; David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo ; D. R. Stinson ; M. Grainger

The authors introduce the notion of a `social secret sharing scheme`, in which shares are allocated based on a player`s reputation and the way he/she interacts with other participants. During the social tuning phase, weights of players are adjusted such that participants who cooperate will end up with more shares than those who defect. Alternatively, newcomers are able to be enrolled in the scheme while corrupted players are disenrolled immediately. In other words, this scheme proactively renews shares at each cycle without changing the secret, and allows trusted participants to gain more authority. The motivation is that, in real-world applications, components of a secure scheme may have different levels of importance (i.e. the number of shares a player has) as well as reputation (i.e. cooperation with other players for the share renewal or secret recovery). Therefore a good construction should balance these two factors, respectively. In the proposed schemes, both the passive and active mobile adversaries are considered in an unconditionally secure setting.

Published in:

IET Information Security  (Volume:4 ,  Issue: 4 )