By Topic

A theoretical signaling game model for intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Estiri, M. ; Islamic A zad Univ.(South Tehran Branch), Tehran, Iran ; Khademzadeh, A.

In this paper, we address a method for an intrusion detection system (IDS) in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The type of the attack that we address in this paper focuses on dropping packets attacks (DPA) in WSNs and we focus on the design of security enforcement mechanisms for preventing attacks as well. we present a signaling game-theoretic model to analyze intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks. We use a signaling game to model the interactions among nodes of a wireless sensor network. We view the interaction between an attacker and an individual node as a Bayesian game with incomplete information, and construct models for such a game. We prove the authenticity of the proposed model by reaching Nash equilibrium. And achieving Nash equilibrium leads to the defense strategy for the WSN.

Published in:

Telecommunications Network Strategy and Planning Symposium (NETWORKS), 2010 14th International

Date of Conference:

27-30 Sept. 2010