By Topic

Towards Efficient Equilibria of Combinations of Network-Formation and Interaction Strategies

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$33 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Bjorn-Oliver Hartmann ; Karlsruhe Inst. of Technol. (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany ; Klemens Bohm

Agents in networks have two strategic choices: They can forward/process incoming service requests - or not, and they can establish additional contacts and maintain or terminate existing ones. In other words, an agent can choose both an action-selection and a link-selection strategy. So far, it is unclear which equilibria exist in such settings. We show that there are the following equilibria: First, an inefficient one where agents leave the network. Second, an equilibrium where agents process requests on behalf of others, i.e., they cooperate. In this second equilibrium, agents distribute their contacts uniformly, which is not efficient. We show that a strategy, we propose in this paper, yields an equilibrium that is optimal, i.e., that yields the highest sum of payoffs over all equilibria. If agents base their link-selection decisions on the processing times of their requests, optimal system states can be equilibria.

Published in:

Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT), 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on  (Volume:2 )

Date of Conference:

Aug. 31 2010-Sept. 3 2010