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Game Analysis of Regulation and Supervision on the Rent-Seeking in Government Procurement

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2 Author(s)
Sun Baowen ; Sch. of Inf., Central Univ. of Finance & Econ., Beijing, China ; Zhang Wei

During the period of e-government innovation, the occurrence of surplus of objects and asymmetry of information, along with the imperfection of market result in the corrupt activities of rent-seeking. The behavior of rent-seeking always yields such bad results that society resources wasted, procurement quality reduced and society atmosphere ruined. This paper starts with a review on the related work of rent-seeking, explains the relationship between the monitoring and supervision probability and the rent-seeking strategies in different situations, and proposes game analysis of regulation and supervision on the rent-seeking in government procurement. Finally, according to the model of the regulation and supervision rent-seeking, we summarize the best strategy of the model, and illustrate how to apply it by the government supervisor department.

Published in:

E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on

Date of Conference:

7-9 May 2010