By Topic

Government incentives and supervision about renewable energy using in large public buildings

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

3 Author(s)
Liu Hong-Wei ; Inst. of Constr. Project Manage., Hohai Univ., Nanjing, China ; Li Fei ; Li Jun

If there is no effective incentive and supervision measures to promote renewable energy in large public buildings, economic incentives may cause moral hazard problems. In accordance with the game theory, the government can not fully grasp the level of actual investment of each large public building owner in using renewable energy. The appropriate incentive and penalty mechanism of government can be designed by the principal - agent theory. Analysis shows that an effective budget-balancing mechanism does not exit under risk neutral condition and the paper constructes a non-budget-balancing mechanism. If the building owners are all fully risk averse in reducing the fund of energy-saving, it is proved that a budget-balancing mechanism exits. If the effective incentives and punishment mechanisms can be established between the owners and the government, the energy efficiency goals can be expected to achieve.

Published in:

Emergency Management and Management Sciences (ICEMMS), 2010 IEEE International Conference on

Date of Conference:

8-10 Aug. 2010