Efficient Dynamic Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks: Centralized Dynamic Spectrum Leasing (C-DSL)

In this paper, we propose the concept of centralized dynamic spectrum leasing (C-DSL), in which multiple primary users belonging to the same primary system participate in the spectrum leasing process with secondary users (potential bidder for spectrum) under centralized control. We develop a new game-theoretic user interaction model suitable for C-DSL in a cognitive radio network. Dynamic Spectrum Leasing (DSL), proposed in allows active participation of both primary and secondary users in the spectrum sharing process. Motivated by network spectrum utilization considerations, we propose generalizations to the primary system utility function defined in and a new utility function for the secondary users. We also generalize the proposed non-cooperative C-DSL game to allow for linear multiuser detectors at the secondary base stations. We formulate the conditions on the primary system and the secondary user utility functions so that the proposed C-DSL game has desired equilibrium properties. We prove that the proposed C-DSL game has unique Nash equilibria (NE) under both matched filter (MF) and linear minimum mean-squared error (LMMSE) receivers. Equilibrium performance of the system and robustness of the proposed game theoretic adaptive implementation are investigated through simulations.