By Topic

Optimal revocations in ephemeral networks: A game-theoretic framework

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$33 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

4 Author(s)
Bilogrevic, I. ; Lab. for Comput. Commun. & Applic. (LCA1), EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland ; Manshaei, H. ; Raya, M. ; Hubaux, J.-P.

Revocation of public-key certificates is an important security primitive. In this paper, we design a fully distributed local certificate revocation scheme for ephemeral networks — a class of extremely volatile wireless networks with short-duration and short-range communications — based on a game-theoretic approach. First, by providing incentives, we can guarantee the successful revocation of the malicious nodes even if they collude. Second, thanks to the records of past behavior, we dynamically adapt the parameters to nodes' reputations and establish the optimal Nash equilibrium (NE) on-the-fly, minimizing the social cost of the revocation. Third, based on the analytical results, we define a unique optimal NE selection protocol and evaluate its performance through simulations. We show that our scheme is effective in quickly and efficiently removing malicious devices from the network.

Published in:

Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (WiOpt), 2010 Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on

Date of Conference:

May 31 2010-June 4 2010