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Market mechanisms have been exploited as important means for spectrum acquisition and access in cognitive radio networks. In this paper, we propose a two-tier market for decentralized dynamic spectrum access. In the proposed Tier-1 market, spectrum is traded from a primary user (PU) to secondary users (SUs) in a relatively large time scale to reduce signaling overhead. Then driven by dynamic traffic demands, SUs set up the Tier-2 market to redistribute channels among themselves in a small time scale. More specifically, we use Nash bargain game to model the spectrum acquisition of SUs in the Tier-1 market and derive the equilibrium prices. We then use strategic bargain game to study the spectrum redistribution in the Tier-2 market, where SUs can exchange channels with low overhead through random matching, bilateral bargain, and the predetermined market equilibrium prices. We disclose how various factors, such as availability of channels and bargain partners, matching schemes, and traffic dynamics, impact the market relationships. This work provides better understanding on the spectrum market and valuable guidelines to primary and secondary network operators.