Cart (Loading....) | Create Account
Close category search window
 

Tamper Evident Microprocessors

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Waksman, A. ; Dept. of Comput. Sci., Columbia Univ., New York, NY, USA ; Sethumadhavan, S.

Most security mechanisms proposed to date unquestioningly place trust in microprocessor hardware. This trust, however, is misplaced and dangerous because microprocessors are vulnerable to insider attacks that can catastrophically compromise security, integrity and privacy of computer systems. In this paper, we describe several methods to strengthen the fundamental assumption about trust in microprocessors. By employing practical, lightweight attack detectors within a microprocessor, we show that it is possible to protect against malicious logic embedded in microprocessor hardware. We propose and evaluate two area-efficient hardware methods - TrustNet and DataWatch - that detect attacks on microprocessor hardware by knowledgeable, malicious insiders. Our mechanisms leverage the fact that multiple components within a microprocessor (e.g., fetch, decode pipeline stage etc.) must necessarily coordinate and communicate to execute even simple instructions, and that any attack on a microprocessor must cause erroneous communications between micro architectural subcomponents used to build a processor. A key aspect of our solution is that TrustNet and DataWatch are themselves highly resilient to corruption. We demonstrate that under realistic assumptions, our solutions can protect pipelines and on-chip cache hierarchies at negligible area cost and with no performance impact. Combining TrustNet and DataWatch with prior work on fault detection has the potential to provide complete coverage against a large class of microprocessor attacks.

Published in:

Security and Privacy (SP), 2010 IEEE Symposium on

Date of Conference:

16-19 May 2010

Need Help?


IEEE Advancing Technology for Humanity About IEEE Xplore | Contact | Help | Terms of Use | Nondiscrimination Policy | Site Map | Privacy & Opting Out of Cookies

A not-for-profit organization, IEEE is the world's largest professional association for the advancement of technology.
© Copyright 2014 IEEE - All rights reserved. Use of this web site signifies your agreement to the terms and conditions.