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The game analyses to price the target enterprise of M&A based on the perspective of real option

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2 Author(s)
Bin Xu ; Sch. of Accountancy, Central Univ. of Finance & Econ., Beijing, China ; Jing Yu

The NPV approach to price the target enterprise of M&A has already been replaced by some contemporary perspectives such as real option perspective and game perspective, etc. In this paper, the dynamic analyses to price the target enterprise of M&A will be developed under stochastic surroundings, and the equilibrium price formula will be proposed by applying the famous offer-counteroffer Rubinstein theorem which will be improved to be fit for the stochastic surroundings. The price formula will further be discussed on condition that the operating cost is less than profit flow which is assumed to follow geometric Brownian motion process. In last the simulations will show how well the proposed formulas reflect the reality.

Published in:

Computer and Automation Engineering (ICCAE), 2010 The 2nd International Conference on  (Volume:2 )

Date of Conference:

26-28 Feb. 2010