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Security analysis of a cocktail protocol with the authentication and key agreement on the UMTS

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3 Author(s)
Shuhua Wu ; Inf. Eng. Univ., Zhengzhou, China ; Yuefei Zhu ; Qiong Pu

To overcome the congenital defects of the UMTS's Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol standard, Ou et al. proposed an improved protocol called the cocktail-AKA protocol recently. In this paper, we first show that it has some security weaknesses, which can be exploited by an adversary to mount a denial of service attack and an impersonation attack. Finally, an effective countermeasure is suggested.

Published in:

Communications Letters, IEEE  (Volume:14 ,  Issue: 4 )