By Topic

Detecting Return-to-libc Buffer Overflow Attacks Using Network Intrusion Detection Systems

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$33 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

3 Author(s)
David J. Day ; Sch. of Comput., Univ. of Derby, Derby, UK ; Zhengxu Zhao ; Minhua Ma

There has been a significant amount of research recently into methods of protecting systems from buffer overflow attacks by detecting stack injected shell code. The majority of the research focuses on developing algorithms or signatures for detecting polymorphic and metamorphic payloads. However much of this problem has already been solved through the mainstream use of host based protection mechanisms e.g. Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address Space Randomization (ASLR). Many hackers are now using the more inventive attack methods e.g., return-to-libc, which do not inject shell code onto the stack and thus evade DEP and common shell code detection mechanisms. The purpose of this work is to propose a series of generic signatures that could be used to detect network born return-to-libc attacks. To this end we outline how we performed a return-to-libc network based attack, which bypasses DEP and common IDS signatures, before suggesting an efficient signature for detection of similar return-to-libc attacks.

Published in:

Digital Society, 2010. ICDS '10. Fourth International Conference on

Date of Conference:

10-16 Feb. 2010