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Covert channels are a mechanism that allows an attacker to parasitically place messages within a legitimate channel. Detection of these covert channels can have consequences for an attacker. Not only is the ability to communicate lost or compromised, but analysis of the channel can lead to the identity of the attacker themselves. If the attacker is a wanted criminal or foreign intelligence service, these consequences can be quite severe. This paper proposes a covert channel with the property of unattributability. That is, in the event the channel is detected, nothing about the channel gives any clues as to the identity of the attacker. The unattributable nature of the covert channel has a cost, however, in that the channel is one-way, with the attacker being unable to send messages, only receive them. As such, the proof-of-concept design uses this covert channel to transmit sensitive information from an infected machine.