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Experimental games for the design of reputation management systems

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1 Author(s)
Keser, C. ; IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, P.O. Box 218, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA

Trust between people engaging in economic transactions affects the economic growth of their community. Reputation management systems, such as the Feedback Forum of eBay Inc., can increase the trust level of the participants. We show in this paper that experimental economics can be used in a controlled laboratory environment to measure trust and trust enhancement. Specifically, we present an experimental study that quantifies the increase in trust produced by two versions of a reputation management system. We also discuss some emerging issues in the design of reputation management systems.

Note: The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Incorporated is distributing this Article with permission of the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) who is the exclusive owner. The recipient of this Article may not assign, sublicense, lease, rent or otherwise transfer, reproduce, prepare derivative works, publicly display or perform, or distribute the Article.  

Published in:

IBM Systems Journal  (Volume:42 ,  Issue: 3 )