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A game theoretic analysis of pricing for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks

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3 Author(s)
Haoran Hong ; Key Lab. of Universal Wireless Commun., Beijing Univ. of Posts & Telecommun., Beijing, China ; Kai Niu ; Zhiqiang He

In cognitive radio networks, primary users can share frequency spectrum with secondary users and charge secondary users for radio resource usage. For the primary user, the price determines its revenue. In this article, we first consider competitive pricing. Under competition, service providers offer the prices simultaneously or sequentially. Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium have been obtained as the solutions, respectively. Furthermore, a cooperative pricing model is presented and we have utilized an N-person coalition game formulation for revenue sharing. Also suggestions about coordination and incentive mechanism among the primary users are proposed.

Published in:

Communications Technology and Applications, 2009. ICCTA '09. IEEE International Conference on

Date of Conference:

16-18 Oct. 2009