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A game-theoretic analysis of spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks

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3 Author(s)
Suchul Lee ; Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., Seoul Nat. Univ., Seoul, South Korea ; Hwanseok Choi ; Chong-Kwon Kim

We address the problem of spectrum sharing with spectrum pricing where the primary user wants to sell the spectrum to the secondary users in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). By equilibrium pricing scheme, each of the players in the spectrum sharing game aims to take the strategy to maximize its own profit under sojourn-time constraint for secondary users. In condition of spectrum sojourn-time is limited because of primary user's channel usage pattern each of spectrum providers will choose different strategy to increase profit more. With the Bertrand model we analyze the impacts of several secondary users' preference to spectrum product provided by primary user. (i.e., channel quality, spectrum substitutability and sojourn-time).

Published in:

Communications and Information Technology, 2009. ISCIT 2009. 9th International Symposium on

Date of Conference:

28-30 Sept. 2009