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Analysis of Transaction Behavior in B to C E-Commerce Based on Incomplete Information Game

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2 Author(s)
Xiuli Cao ; Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Hebei Univ. of Eng., Handan ; Yikai Zhang

With rapid development of e-commerce, in the B to C e-commerce transaction model, it has brought about a lot of convenience to consumers, at the same time some consumers were deceived, the reason of which is incomplete information for consumers. Operators transmit false information to consumers, and consumers can not identify, which greatly reduces the efficiency of the transaction network. In this paper adopts signaling game model to analyze the authenticity of the information of operators in e-commerce, and put forward strategies to reduce false information.

Published in:

Education Technology and Computer Science, 2009. ETCS '09. First International Workshop on  (Volume:1 )

Date of Conference:

7-8 March 2009