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Security analysis of the song-mitchell authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags

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3 Author(s)
Rizomiliotis, P. ; Dept. of Inf. & Commun. Syst. Eng., Univ. of the Aegean, Karlovassi ; Rekleitis, E. ; Gritzalis, S.

In this paper, we describe an attack against one of the most efficient authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags recently proposed by Song and Mitchell. A weak attacker, i.e. an attacker that has no access to the internal data of a tag, is able to impersonate a legitimate reader/server, and to desynchronize a tag. The attack is very efficient and has minimal computational complexity. Finally, we propose a simple solution to fix the flaw.

Published in:

Communications Letters, IEEE  (Volume:13 ,  Issue: 4 )

Date of Publication:

April 2009

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