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Auction in multi-path multi-hop routing

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3 Author(s)
Xueyuan Su ; Dept. of Comput. Sci., Yale Univ., New Haven, CT ; Chan, S. ; Gang Peng

We model the multi-path multi-hop routing in networks with selfish nodes as an auction and provide a novel solution from the game-theoretical perspective. We design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strategy proofness, which alleviates the over-payment problem of the widely used VCG mechanism. Through theoretical analysis, the proposed protocol is shown to be effective.

Published in:

Communications Letters, IEEE  (Volume:13 ,  Issue: 2 )