Referenced Items are not available for this document.
In this paper, we consider inventory outsourcing by a producer to a distributor. The distributor charges a cost for each unit it handles and the manufacturer responds with a production and inventory policy over a finite contract period. As a result, the two parties enter a noncooperative differential game. We address the effect of information asymmetry in such a game under a stochastic demand when the inventory level can only be observed by the manufacturer intermittently.
Published in:
Automation Science and Engineering, IEEE Transactions on
(Volume:7
,
Issue:
2
)
Date of Publication: April 2010
- Page(s):
- 197 - 207
- ISSN :
- 1545-5955
- INSPEC Accession Number:
- 11208210
- Digital Object Identifier :
- 10.1109/TASE.2008.2006569
- Product Type:
- Journals & Magazines
- Date of Publication :
- 09 January 2009
- Date of Current Version :
- 05 April 2010
- Issue Date :
- April 2010
- Sponsored by :
- IEEE Robotics and Automation Society
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