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The Research on Optimal Contract Design in the Quality Management of Reverse Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

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1 Author(s)
Shen Liang ; Sch. of Finance, Shandong Economic Univ., Jinan

This paper focuses on moral hazard problems of reverse supply chain in which the manufacturer and the take-backer may take unobserved action. In order to motivate the take-backer and the manufacturer's actions, we analyze how to specify conditions on contract parameters, the goal is to maximize the profits both each node enterprise and reverse supply chain.

Published in:

Intelligent Information Technology Application Workshops, 2008. IITAW '08. International Symposium on

Date of Conference:

21-22 Dec. 2008