By Topic

Quality Incentive Mechanism Design of Construction Project: Quality Rank-Order Tournaments Model and Optimal Prizes Allocation in the Parallel Contracting Mode

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Xuelin Li ; Sch. of Water Conservancy, Changsha Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Changsha ; Zhuofu Wang

In the parallel contracting mode with characteristics of single client and several contractors in construction phase, quality rank-order tournaments is analyzed whether it can incentive contractors to improve quality or not from the angle of client by applying the correlation theory and technique of Game theory and Economics of Information. Quality rank-order tournaments game model is established, the optimal allocation of prizes is studied when the contractors' cost functions are convex. The result shows that in different conditions different optimal allocation of prizes should be adopted such as single prize or several positive prizes, furthermore, the optimal structure of prizes when several prizes are adopted is given.

Published in:

Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2008. WiCOM '08. 4th International Conference on

Date of Conference:

12-14 Oct. 2008