By Topic

An Analysis on Cooperation Game of Wintel Alliance

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$33 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Ping Gui ; Sch. of Manage., Wuhan Univ. of Technol., Wuhan ; Shan Huang

The Nash equilibrium point of Microsoft and Intel alliance is (cooperate, cooperate), so the optimal state of the alliance system can be automatically achieved. In static viewpoint, the monopoly profit is the boundary of the negotiation set in one cooperation cycle. In dynamic viewpoint, with the advancement of the technology and the increasing of the demand, the transition of Microsoft and Intel Alliance's negotiation set will be continuous.

Published in:

2008 4th International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing

Date of Conference:

12-14 Oct. 2008