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Electricity market equilibrium using competitive coevolutionary algorithms with transmission constraints

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2 Author(s)
Ladjici, A.A. ; Electr. Eng. Dept., Univ. of Sci. & Technol. Houari Boumediene, Algiers ; Boudour, M.

Market equilibrium of an oligopolistic electricity market considering transmission constraints. The market game is played by bounded evolutionary agents, adapting their strategies to maximize their profits in a competitive environment. This paper considers a centralized market with maximalist ISO. The ISO performs an OPF based on submitted Agentspsila bid and calculates the power to be dispatched from each supplier, in order to maximize the social welfare and preserve the integrity of the power system, while, market agents interact strategically to maximize their profit. By using competitive coevolutionary algorithm as a learning algorithm, agentspsila strategies are led towards Nash-Cournot equilibrium, where no agent is incited to change unilaterally his strategy.

Published in:

Systems, Signals and Devices, 2008. IEEE SSD 2008. 5th International Multi-Conference on

Date of Conference:

20-22 July 2008