By Topic

Game-theoretic approach to service level agreement for resource sharing

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

1 Author(s)
Charoensiriwath, C. ; Nat. Electron. & Comput. Technol. Center, Pathumthani

This study analyzes the situation when a capacitated facility is in need to use resource from another facility to serve its own customer. It can redirect the customer to another facility. The two facilities have an agreement to pay the other facility if this situation should arise. However, the referred facility holds the right to accept or decline the offer by another facility. Therefore, each facility sets a service level to serve referred customer. A bufferless queueing model is constructed to reflect the impatient customer. The model is analyzed using a game-theoretic approach. Finally, the Nash equilibrium of the service level set by each facility is calculated.

Published in:

Electrical Engineering/Electronics, Computer, Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2008. ECTI-CON 2008. 5th International Conference on  (Volume:1 )

Date of Conference:

14-17 May 2008