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Optimal bidding in a multi-period electricity spot market

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3 Author(s)
Beck, E.V. ; EPFL-STI-LRE, Laussane ; Cherkaoui, R. ; Germond, A.

We address here the problem of computation of pure Nash equilibria for electricity markets having a large number of players and for which the players have a discrete set of strategies. Identification of pure Nash equilibria in such type of games can be done in principle by relying on an exhaustive search process which consists of checking whether every single combined strategy corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, the number of operation that are required for identifying with such a process the Nash equilibria of a game growths exponentially with the number of players, making such an approach rapidly computationally impractical.

Published in:

Electric Utility Deregulation and Restructuring and Power Technologies, 2008. DRPT 2008. Third International Conference on

Date of Conference:

6-9 April 2008