Referenced Items are not available for this document.
Regarding the packet-switching problem, we prove that the weighed max-min fair service rates comprise the unique Nash equilibrium point of a strategic game, specifically a throughput auction based on a ldquoleast-demanding first-servedrdquo principle. We prove that a buffered crossbar switch can converge to this equilibrium with no pre-computation or internal acceleration, with either randomized or deterministic schedulers, (the latter with a minimum buffering of a single-packet per crosspoint). Finally, we present various simulation results that corroborate and extend our analysis.
Published in:
Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on
(Volume:16
,
Issue:
6
)
Date of Publication: Dec. 2008
- Page(s):
- 1340 - 1351
- ISSN :
- 1063-6692
- INSPEC Accession Number:
- 10361223
- Digital Object Identifier :
- 10.1109/TNET.2007.911441
- Product Type:
- Journals & Magazines
- Date of Publication :
- 03 March 2008
- Date of Current Version :
- 16 December 2008
- Issue Date :
- Dec. 2008
- Sponsored by :
- Association for Computing Machinery
About IEEE Xplore | Contact | Help | Terms of Use | Nondiscrimination Policy | Site Map | Privacy & Opting Out of Cookies
A not-for-profit organization, IEEE is the world's largest professional association for the advancement of technology.
© Copyright 2013 IEEE - All rights reserved. Use of this web site signifies your agreement to the terms and conditions.
