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Simulations of the evolution of cooperation between the enterprises in cluster based on BA social networks

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3 Author(s)
Wang Wenping ; Southeast Univ., Nanjing ; Yu Ziping ; Shen Qiuying

In this paper, the evolutionary rule of the cooperation relationships between the enterprises in cluster is studied, based on a new scale-free network evolving mechanism and simulations. With the new iterated Prisoner's dilemma game model on scale-free social networks, we obtained some valuable conclusions, such as that different rules of changing strategies influence the correlation between the evolution stabilization value of the average cooperation proportion and its initial value, and the evolution stabilization value of the average cooperation proportion isn't influenced by the whiten temptation value of otimes (b) in grey payoff matrix.

Published in:

Grey Systems and Intelligent Services, 2007. GSIS 2007. IEEE International Conference on

Date of Conference:

18-20 Nov. 2007