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The Analysis of the Functionary and Enterprise Behaviors in the Property Right Transaction by Game Theory: on the Basis of Rent-Seeking Theory

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3 Author(s)
Yang Hong ; Management School, Xi'an Jiaotong University, P.R.China, 710049 ; Yang Shu-e ; Zhang Qiang

Rent seeking can cause the waste of social resource enormously. Based on rent seeking theory, this paper analyzes the behaviors of the functionary and enterprises in the transaction of property right by game theory, and points out that rent seeking with low costs, the low probability of investigating the improper intervention of the official and the punishing deficiency are the origins of the rent seeking behaviors in our right trade market. At last, it gives the political suggestion to Chinese right trade market, such as perfecting the government supervision system, devoting more efforts to punishing the official' improper intervention and reducing the economic interference of government to the state-owned enterprise.

Published in:

2007 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering

Date of Conference:

20-22 Aug. 2007