By Topic

Research on supply chain disruption coordination mechanisms under algebraic demand and asymmetric information

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Zhuang, Pin ; Southeast Univ., Nanjing ; Lin-Du Zhao

This paper studies the optimal decisions of a supply chain involving one supplier and one retailer with asymmetric information after the retailer's cost was disruption. We consider two scenarios: coordination mechanism under asymmetric information in a regular scenario and in an irregular scenario (with retailer's cost disruption). Our research shows that, it is optimal for the supply chain to keep the original coordination mechanism if the retailer's cost change is sufficiently small. Decisions must be remade if retailer's cost change is larger. We illustrate the results by numerical analysis.

Published in:

Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2007 IEEE International Conference on

Date of Conference:

2-4 Dec. 2007