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Multi-Period Optimal Design of Online Auctions

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3 Author(s)
Chen Sheng-li ; Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Wuhan ; Yang Xiao-hua ; Luo Yun-feng

In this paper, we first analyze the characteristics of online auction and propose a general analysis framework about the design of online auction. Based on the properties of online auction and a general analysis framework related to the design of online auction, then we discuss the multi-unit dynamic programming models of sequential online auction in order to maximize the seller' expected profits whether the reserve price is private or public. It is shown that the seller with private reserve price can gain the bigger profits than the seller with public reserve price. Finally, numerical results for two cases are given, where we compute the maximal expected total revenue. We show that the numerical results are consistent with the theoretical analysis.

Published in:

Data, Privacy, and E-Commerce, 2007. ISDPE 2007. The First International Symposium on

Date of Conference:

1-3 Nov. 2007