Scheduled System Maintenance:
On Monday, April 27th, IEEE Xplore will undergo scheduled maintenance from 1:00 PM - 3:00 PM ET (17:00 - 19:00 UTC). No interruption in service is anticipated.
By Topic

Security in SRAM FPGAs

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

1 Author(s)
Trimberger, S. ; Xilinx Res. Lab., San Jose

As FPGAs have grown larger and more complex, the value of the IP implemented in them has grown commensurately. Since SRAM FPGAs reload their programming data every time they are powered up, an adversary can potentially copy the program as it is being loaded. FPGA manufacturers have added security features to protect designs from unauthorized copy, theft, and reverse-engineering as the bitstream is transmitted from permanent storage into the FPGA. These bitstream security features use well-known information security methods to protect design data. In this discussion, it is assumed that an adversary has physical access to the FPGA. In this environment, denial-of-service attacks on the configuration are irrelevant: A trivial denial-of-service method would be to physically damage the device - the so-called "whack-it-with-a-hammer" attack.

Published in:

Design & Test of Computers, IEEE  (Volume:24 ,  Issue: 6 )