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In this paper, we enable wireless stations (WSTAs) to proactively engage in the resource management game coordinated by a Central Spectrum Moderator (CSM). We model WSTAs as rational and selfish players competing for available wireless resources in the dynamic game. The CSM deploys a novel resource management scheme based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to determine a) the amount of resource to be allocated to the various WSTAs and b) the cost associated to the allocated resources. The cost is introduced in order to discourage WSTAs from lying about their resource requirements. Each WSTA is allowed to play the resource management game by adapting its multimedia transmission strategy depending on the experienced channel conditions and derived video quality for resources. Our simulations show that using the VCG mechanism the WSTAs do not have any incentives to lie about their resource requirements as otherwise they will be severely penalized by a high cost.