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Current Mask Generation: A Transistor Level Security Against DPA Attacks

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7 Author(s)
Mesquita, D. ; Lab. d''Informatique, de Robotique et de Microelectronique de Montpellier, Univ. Montpellier II ; Techer, J.-D. ; Torres, L. ; Sassatelli, G.
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The physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms may leak to some attacker security information by the side channel data, as power consumption, timing, temperature or electromagnetic emanation. The differential power analysis (DPA) is a powerful side channel attack, based only on the power consumption information. There are some countermeasures proposed at algorithmic or architectural level that are expensive and/or complexes. This paper addresses the DPA attack problem by a novel and efficient transistor-level method based on a power consumption control, without any modification on the cryptographic algorithms, messages or keys

Published in:

Integrated Circuits and Systems Design, 18th Symposium on

Date of Conference:

4-7 Sept. 2005