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Strategic Choose to the Technological Innovation of Firms in Industrial Cluster

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1 Author(s)
Chen Xu ; Sch. of Manage., Univ. of Electron. Sci. & Technol., Chengdu

Based on the two-stage game model of A-J, by introducing the variable of duopoly firm's distance attenuation coefficient and perfect information dynamic gambling, this paper discussed the change of duopoly Nash equilibrium output in output stage in the situation of independent innovation, cooperative innovation and imitative innovation, and compared the influence of firm's technological innovation strategy on the firm's innovation investment, the output and the profit. This provided a theoretical basis for the industrial cluster firms when choosing technological innovation strategy

Published in:

Management Science and Engineering, 2006. ICMSE '06. 2006 International Conference on

Date of Conference:

5-7 Oct. 2006