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Research on Traders' Offer Strategy Based on Incomplete Information Games in Online Double Auction Market and Computer Simulation

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4 Author(s)
Fu Jing ; School of Computer Science, Sichuan Normal University, P.R.China, 610068; School of Management, University of Electronic and Science Technology of China, P.R.China, 610054 ; Shao Pei-ji ; Yang Xiao-ping ; Zhao Yang

"Smith's mystery" revealed the characteristics of double auction: even with insufficient information of supply and demand and a small number of traders, the double auction can achieve very high market efficiency and converge rapidly to a competitive equilibrium. These characteristics provide us an important theoretic foundation by which can preferably solve how to utilize the network resource effectively and ease the network burden in the double auction market. Meanwhile, the offer strategy in the double auction is a vital factory to affect the auction efficiency. This paper, in terms of the experimental economics, intends to develop an offer model on Bayesian Nash equilibrium based on incomplete information games and solve it. In particular, we devised simulation experiments to analyze the characters and possibilities of this model. Finally, the experiment results show that the transaction path under adopting this offer strategy follows the Marshallian path strictly; we can get a practical idea of utilizing the network resource effectively and improving the efficiency in online auction

Published in:

2006 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering

Date of Conference:

5-7 Oct. 2006