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Algorithms for static stackelberg games with linear costs and polyhedra constraints

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1 Author(s)
George P. Papavassilopoulos ; University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California

Three algorithms for solving the static Stackelberg game with two decision makers, linear costs and polyhedra constraints are presented. The nonconvexity of the Reaction set of the Follower is a major source of difficulty in solving such problems. The algorithms presented are able to bypass this difficulty and find the solution in a finite number of iterations.

Published in:

Decision and Control, 1982 21st IEEE Conference on

Date of Conference:

8-10 Dec. 1982