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Optimal Mechanism Design for Multi-Objective Double Auction

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2 Author(s)
Hong Yin ; Sch. of Bus., East China Normal Univ., Shanghai ; Xian-Jia Wang

This paper aims at designing a mechanism for multi-objective double auction, which can clear market, satisfy budget restriction, be incentive compatible and maximize the revenue of both sides of buyer and seller. In virtue of the idea of Myerson's mechanism design, this paper first establishes a double auction model that can be regarded as a multi-objective and multi-restrictions optimization problem. By solving this problem, we get the optimal auction mechanism. Further, we make numeral analysis and discuss for the allocation efficiency of this mechanism

Published in:

Machine Learning and Cybernetics, 2006 International Conference on

Date of Conference:

13-16 Aug. 2006

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