A Game-Theoretic Framework for Distributed Power Control in Wireless Ad HOC Networks

This paper presents a novel game-theoretic framework for distributed adaptive power control in wireless ad-hoc networks. It first shows the equivalency of two recent approaches to this noncooperative field - the QoS utility maximization approach and the best-response approach. We then choose to follow the analytically more intuitive best-response approach and analyze in an abstract way general conditions for existence of optimal outcomes (Nash equilibria) of best-response power control dynamics. Consequently, we characterize conditions for global convergence to such states without any particular technical assumption. Our work provides a mathematically more general insight to game-theoretic power control compared to recent related works. Using the herein developed framework, we discuss CIR-based utility function maximization and show conditions for applicability of linear (linearized) best-response power control in connection with illustrative simulations