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3 Author(s)
Tim Leinmuller ; DaimlerChrysler AG ; Elmar Schoch ; Frank Kargl

Intervehicle communication is regarded as one of the major applications of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Compared to MANETs, these so-called vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have special requirements in terms of node mobility and position-dependent applications, which are well met by geographic routing protocols. Functional research on geographic routing has already reached a considerable level, whereas security aspects have been vastly neglected so far. Since position dissemination is crucial for geographic routing, forged position information has severe impact regarding both performance and security. In this work, we first analyze the problems that may arise from falsified position data. Then, in order to lessen these problems, we propose detection mechanisms that are capable of recognizing nodes cheating about their location in position beacons. In contrast to other position verification approaches, our solution does not rely on special hardware or dedicated infrastructure. Evaluation based on simulations shows that our position verification system successfully discloses nodes disseminating false positions and thereby widely prevents attacks using position cheating

Published in:

IEEE Wireless Communications  (Volume:13 ,  Issue: 5 )