By Topic

Utility-cogenerator game for pricing power sales and wheeling fees

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Kuwahata, A. ; Central Res. Inst. of Electr. Power Ind., Komae, Japan ; Asano, H.

The authors have studied an extensive game model of an electricity market where a cogenerator sells excess electricity to an electric utility or to an end user. They found that a buy-back system (the utility purchases cogenerated power) is as efficient as a cogenerator-customer wheeling system and that these two systems are more desirable than a monopoly system for the regulator. The buy-back rate should be equal to (LP bargaining solution) or less than (Nash bargaining solution) the marginal cost of the electric utility. They also conducted an analysis of a two-period electricity market in which they found that the cogenerator that can supply excess power during peak period obtains the market advantage

Published in:

Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on  (Volume:9 ,  Issue: 4 )