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Decentralized learning of Nash equilibria in multi-person stochastic games with incomplete information

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3 Author(s)
P. S. Sastry ; Dept. of Electr. Eng., Indian Inst. of Sci., Bangalore, India ; V. V. Phansalkar ; M. A. L. Thathachar

A multi-person discrete game where the payoff after each play is stochastic is considered. The distribution of the random payoff is unknown to the players and further none of the players know the strategies or the actual moves of other players. A learning algorithm for the game based on a decentralized team of learning automata is presented. It is proved that all stable stationary points of the algorithm are Nash equilibria for the game. Two special cases of the game are also discussed, namely, game with common payoff and the relaxation labelling problem. The former has applications such as pattern recognition and the latter is a problem widely studied in computer vision. For the two special cases it is shown that the algorithm always converges to a desirable solution

Published in:

IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics  (Volume:24 ,  Issue: 5 )