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The Space Shuttle: a case of subjective engineering

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2 Author(s)

NASA's approach to risk management, which until the Challenger accident focused on design-oriented techniques rather than probabilistic risk analysis (PRA), is discussed. Political factors that have played a large role in shaping NASA's decisions, along with its traditional-engineering-based corporate culture, are examined. NASA's present experiments with PRA, which are hampered by lack of statistical data, are described. Implications for the future Space Station are also considered.<>

Published in:

Spectrum, IEEE  (Volume:26 ,  Issue: 6 )

Date of Publication:

June 1989

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