Referenced Items are not available for this document.
The authors consider a communication network shared by several selfish users. Each user seeks to optimize its own performance by controlling the routing of its given flow demand, giving rise to a noncooperative game. They investigate the Nash equilibrium of such systems. For a two-node multiple links system, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is proven under reasonable convexity conditions. It is shown that this Nash equilibrium point possesses interesting monotonicity properties. For general networks, these convexity conditions are not sufficient for guaranteeing uniqueness, and a counterexample is presented. Nonetheless, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for general topologies is established under various assumptions
Published in:
Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on
(Volume:1
,
Issue:
5
)
Date of Publication: Oct 1993
- Page(s):
- 510 - 521
- ISSN :
- 1063-6692
- INSPEC Accession Number:
- 4606629
- Digital Object Identifier :
- 10.1109/90.251910
- Product Type:
- Journals & Magazines
- Date of Current Version :
- 06 August 2002
- Issue Date :
- Oct 1993
- Sponsored by :
- Association for Computing Machinery
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