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Game theory approach to use of noncommercial power plants under time-of-use pricing

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2 Author(s)
Maeda, A. ; Tokyo Electric Power Co., Japan ; Kaya, Yoichi

The authors use the game theory approach for evaluating the impact of the introduction of customer-owned noncommercial power plants (NCP) when time-of-use pricing is used. Various results from this analysis are derived, some of which are that the conflict between NCP customer and the supplier forces the supplier to reduce the price of NCP customers. Perception of the situation in which they are involved in plays an important role in this conflict. The game model analysis presented provides a detailed quantitative information on electricity prices and on the ways of using NCP

Published in:

Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on  (Volume:7 ,  Issue: 3 )