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Preserving source location privacy in monitoring-based wireless sensor networks

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3 Author(s)
Yong Xi ; Dept. of Comput. Sci., Wayne State Univ., Detroit, MI ; Schwiebert, L. ; Weisong Shi

While a wireless sensor network is deployed to monitor certain events and pinpoint their locations, the location information is intended only for legitimate users. However, an eavesdropper can monitor the traffic and deduce the approximate location of monitored objects in certain situations. We first describe a successful attack against the flooding-based phantom routing, proposed in the seminal work by Celal Ozturk, Yanyong Zhang, and Wade Trappe. Then, we propose GROW (Greedy Random Walk), a two-way random walk, i.e., from both source and sink, to reduce the chance an eavesdropper can collect the location information. We improve the delivery rate by using local broadcasting and greedy forwarding. Privacy protection is verified under a backtracking attack model. The message delivery time is a little longer than that of the broadcasting-based approach, but it is still acceptable if we consider the enhanced privacy preserving capability of this new approach. At the same time, the energy consumption is less than half the energy consumption of flooding-base phantom routing, which is preferred in a low duty cycle, environmental monitoring sensor network

Published in:

Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, 2006. IPDPS 2006. 20th International

Date of Conference:

25-29 April 2006