Scheduled System Maintenance:
Some services will be unavailable Sunday, March 29th through Monday, March 30th. We apologize for the inconvenience.
By Topic

Forgery attacks on digital signature schemes without using one-way hash and message redundancy

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

1 Author(s)
Hung-Yu Chien ; Dept. of Inf. Manage., Chao Yang Univ. of Technol., Taiwan, China

Chang and Chang proposed a new digital signature scheme, and claimed the scheme can resist the forgery attack without using one-way hash function and any redundancy padding. This claim is very interesting to all designers, because conventionally a one-way hash function is required to resist the attacks. This article shows an existential forgery attack on the scheme, and shows that the scheme would still be insecure even if a secure one-way function were adopted in the scheme.

Published in:

Communications Letters, IEEE  (Volume:10 ,  Issue: 5 )