By Topic

A one-shot random access game for wireless networks

Sign In

Cookies must be enabled to login.After enabling cookies , please use refresh or reload or ctrl+f5 on the browser for the login options.

Formats Non-Member Member
$31 $13
Learn how you can qualify for the best price for this item!
Become an IEEE Member or Subscribe to
IEEE Xplore for exclusive pricing!
close button

puzzle piece

IEEE membership options for an individual and IEEE Xplore subscriptions for an organization offer the most affordable access to essential journal articles, conference papers, standards, eBooks, and eLearning courses.

Learn more about:

IEEE membership

IEEE Xplore subscriptions

2 Author(s)
Inaltekin, H. ; Sch. of Electr. Eng., Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY, USA ; Wicker, S.

We address the fundamental question of whether or not there exist stable operating points in a network in which selfish nodes share a common channel, and consider how the system behaves asymptotically at these stable operating points as n approaches infinity. We begin with a wireless communication network in which n identical nodes (agents) contend for access on a common, wireless communication channel. We characterize this distributed multiple access problem in terms of a homogeneous one-shot random access game, and then analyze the behavior of the nodes using the tools of game theory. We completely characterize the Nash equilibria of this game for all n ≤ 2, and show that there exists a unique fully-mixed Nash equilibrium (FMNE) that is also a focal equilibrium . We show that all centrally controlled optimal solutions are a subset of this game theoretic solution. We then conclude with results about the asymptotic behavior of the nodes as n → ∞, including a bound on the rate of convergence.

Published in:

Wireless Networks, Communications and Mobile Computing, 2005 International Conference on  (Volume:2 )

Date of Conference:

13-16 June 2005