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A proof of secrecy for a network security model

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2 Author(s)
MacEwen, G. ; Dept. of Comput. & Inf. Sci., Queen''s Univ., Kingston, Ont., Canada ; Glasgow, J.

The network security model originally developed for the SNet secure system is generally applicable to all secure networks. Although it was recognized that allowing message loss in the model permits a covert channel, this operational model was accepted on an intuitive basis as enforcing some concept of secrecy. The paper presents a formal argument that the model, augmented with a no-loss requirement, does indeed satisfy a formal abstract secrecy policy. This secrecy policy, called INF, has previously been defined in terms of security logic. The proof contains two steps. First, the network model augmented with a no-loss requirement (and called NM) is shown to satisfy the non-deducibility (ND) condition. ND satisfies INF, therefore, NM satisfies INF

Published in:

Computer Security Foundations Workshop IV, 1991. Proceedings

Date of Conference:

18-20 Jun 1991