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Authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol using a single cryptographic assumption

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3 Author(s)
L. Harn ; Sch. of Comput. & Eng., Univ. of Missouri Kansas City, MO, USA ; W. -J. Hsin ; M. Mehta

In modern communication systems, a popular way of providing authentication in an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is to sign the result of a one-way hash function (such as MD5) of a Diffie-Hellman public key. The security of such a protocol is based on the weakest of all the cryptographic assumptions of the algorithms involved: Diffie-Hellman key distribution, digital signature and a one-way hash function. If a protocol can be constructed using one cryptographic assumption, it would be at least as secure as that with multiple assumptions. The authors propose three authenticated Diffie-Hellman key-agreement protocols, each of which is based on one cryptographic assumption. In particular, the first protocol is based on a discrete logarithm, the second on an elliptic curve and the third on RSA factoring. The main objective of the paper is to show that the security of a protocol should be assessed at the protocol level as a whole, rather than at the level of individual algorithms that are used to build the protocol.

Published in:

IEE Proceedings - Communications  (Volume:152 ,  Issue: 4 )